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I. INTRODUCTION 
Professor Waller asks an un-American question - what can the 
United States antitrust program learn from the rest of the world?1 This 
question is un-American because we in the United States rarely look to 
others for advice. Besides, we invented antitrust2 and we were 
practically alone in the world in enforcing antitrust for almost a 
century. 3 Only during the current generation have many other nations 
had active and vigorous antitrust programs.4 Moreover, the United 
States is in the business of exporting our accumulated century of 
* Venable Professor of Law, University of Baltimore School of Law and Director, American 
Antitrust Institute. The author would like to thank Kelly Phillips and Michaela Roberts for 
excellent research assistance. 
\. See Spencer Weber Waller, Bringing Globalism Home: Lessons from Antitrust and Beyond, 
32 LoY. U. CHI. L. J. 113 (2000). 
2. Professor Waller notes that, technically, Canada enacted an antitrust law a year before the 
United States did. See Waller, supra note I, at 114. But Canada's antitrust law was virtually 
unenforced until the 1980s. See W.T. Stanbury, Legislation to Control Agreements in Restraint 
of Trade in Canada: Review of the Historical Record and Proposals for Reform, in CANADIAN 
COMPETITION LAW AND POLICY AT THE CENTENARY 61-148 (R.S. Khemani & W.T. Stanbury 
eds., 1991). Moreover, several individual states within the United States enacted their own 
antitrust laws before the Canadian law was passed. See James May, Antitrust Practice and 
Procedure in the Formative Era: The Constitutional and Conceptual Reach of State Antitrust 
Law, 1880-1918, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 495, 498-500 (1987). Professor May demonstrates that 
several extremely important state antitrust cases were filed before the Canadian antitrust law was 
passed. See id. at 500-01. Thus, the Canadians cannot truly be said to have been in the antitrust 
business before the United States. 
3. Our first national antitrust law was passed in 1890. See 15 U.S.c. §§ 1-7 (1994) 
(commonly referred to as the Sherman Act); see also 9 JULIAN O. VON KALINOWSKI ET AL., 
ANTITRUST LAWS & TRADE REGULATION § 200m, at 200-6 to 200-7 (Frank Fine ed., 2d ed. 
2000). By contrast, other nations rarely possessed and enforced their own antitrust laws before 
1960. See THOMAS C. VINJE ET AL., WORLD ANTITRUST LAW AND PRACTICE §§ 15.1,25.2, 
26.1,28.1, 29B.I, 29C.I, 33.1, 35.1 (James J. Garrett ed. 1997 & Supp. 1999) (detailing the 
beginnings of antitrust law in the European Union, United Kingdom, Germany, Italy, Belgium, 
the Netherlands, Mexico and Japan). 
4. See VINJE ET AL., supra note 3, §§ 15.1,25.2,26.1,28.1, 29B.I, 29C.1, 33.1, 35.1. 
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antitrust wisdom through a wide variety of methods, and we revel in 
playing this role.5 We Americans are generally provincial and 
unaccustomed to taking advice from the rest of the world in anything, 
but least of all in the area of antitrust.6 That is why Professor Waller's 
suggestion that we do so is un-American. 
Still, there are three reasons why Professor Waller is correct and the 
United States should consider what lessons we could learn from other 
nations. First, the European Community and other nations now have 
had roughly a generation of real experience with antitrust.7 Although 
their economies are as developed as ours, they have different laws and 
different enforcement mechanisms.8 They have had different antitrust 
experiences and have run "laboratory tests" that we have, perhaps, never 
run, or have run only during a very different economic era.9 
Second, other nations have essentially re-thought every antitrust issue 
from scratch. The Europeans take much less for granted and will ask 
questions that we may not ask.lO By contrast, after more than a century 
of antitrust, we often have an incrementalist mentality. 
Third, if we are so smart, why has our antitrust policy changed so 
radically within the past generation? I I Contrast Warren Court antitrust 
policy with Reagan Administration antitrust policy with Clinton 
Administration antitrust policy and you will see sharp, even radical, 
swings in policy.12 We certainly cannot say with a straight face that, 
with our century of experience, we have got antitrust policy basically 
right and are now just fiddling with the fourth decimal place. 13 For all 
5. Among the methods that we use to share our accumulated antitrust expertise are 
conferences, courses, sending people to work with new competition agencies, sending material, 
and discussing issues over the phone and bye-mail. I confess that I have joined the bandwagon 
and evangelized the virtues of American antitrust at meetings and conferences in Europe, Latin 
America, and Asia, and have advised visiting delegations from many nations. 
6. See Waller, supra note I, at 115. 
7. See VINJE ET AL., supra note 3, §§ IS.!, 25.2, 26.1, 28.1, 29B.!, 29C.1, 33.1,35.1. 
8. See id. 
9. There might be times, moreover, where we can learn antitrust lessons even from nations 
without effective antitrust enforcement. See Robert H. Lande & Richard O. Zerbe, Jr., 
Anticonsumer Effects of Union Mergers: An Antitrust Solution, 46 DUKE L.J. 197,227-37 (1996); 
Robert H. Lande & Richard O. Zerbe, Jr., More Lessons From Japan: End lndustrywide 
Collective Bargaining?, 4 ASIAN ECON. J. 28 (1990) (both analyzing the collective bargaining 
system in Japan as a potential model for the United States). 
10. See Waller, supra note I, at liS. 
II. See, e.g., Robert H. Lande, The Rise and (Coming) Fall of Efficiency as the Ruler of 
Antitrust, 33 ANTITRUST BULL. 429, 458-63 (1988). 
12. See id. at 438-44. 
13. For example, there is much debate over whether the current Microsoft case represents 
sound policy. Commentators in the United States are sharply divided. See, e.g., Waller, supra 
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of these reasons, Professor Waller is correct and we should start to look 
to foreign antitrust experiences for guidance. 
The tremendous difficulty with examining the antitrust laws of other 
nations is one that Professor Waller highlights. Antitrust systems have 
to be made with due regard for the history, culture, politics, and 
institutions of the affected nations. I4 Just as other nations must hesitate 
before adopting our suggestions, so too must we hesitate before 
adopting advice based upon their experiences. With this in mind I will 
comment upon many of the issues that Professor Waller raised. 
II. THE NEED TO CONTROL PUBLIC ECONOMIC POWER 
Professor Waller observes that in the United States we have such 
high regard for federalism and local authority that we have decided that 
the antitrust laws were not intended to apply to the conduct of a state or 
subsidiary unit unless there is some affirmative reason to believe that 
this presumption is incorrect. 15 We elevate this concern so much that 
we have even constitutionalized it.I6 As Professor Waller notes, we 
interpret this immunity from antitrust scrutiny quite broadly. 17 
Professor Waller observes that the European Union utilizes a much 
narrower "state action" exemption, in most cases forbidding member 
nations from taking any measure contrary to the Treaty of Rome. 18 He 
also cites other nations with a similarly broad reach to their antitrust 
laws and a similarly narrow "state action" exception. I9 
Professor Waller convincingly cites a wide range of authority for the 
proposition that governmental units often engage in significantly 
anticompetitive rent-seeking behavior. 20 
note I, at 118. 
14. See id. at 114-15. I made this point as a routine matter when I gave lectures on lessons 
that might be learned from United States antitrust experience in Peru, Venezuela and Japan. On 
every occasion I was congratulated for not showing the arrogance of previous United States 
speakers who evangelized United States antitrust law without due regard for local conditions. 
15. See Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341 (1943) (holding that the marketing plan adopted for the 
1940 raisin crop under the California Agricultural Prorate Act was not a violation of the federal 
Sherman Act, the Agricultural Marketing Agreement Act of 1937, or the Commerce Clause of the 
Constitution); Waller, supra note I, at 118-19. 
16. See Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996) (holding that the Eleventh 
Amendment prohibits Congress from authorizing suits enacted under the Indian Gaming 
Regulatory Act by Native American tribes against states that do not consent to be sued). 
17. See Waller, supra note I, at 120. 
18. See id. at 121-22. 
19. See id. at 123-24. 
20. See id. at 120-21. 
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He also points out how the United States' unusually broad "state 
action" doctrine is likely to handicap it in a variety of international trade 
negotiations involving the World Trade Organization, the North 
American Free Trade Agreement, etc.21 
Professor Waller, therefore, believes that we should adopt a "state 
action" doctrine closer to the European approach, one that is in certain 
respects the opposite from the one we currently employ.22 Professor 
Waller asserts that the United States should start with a presumption 
that antitrust laws apply to anticompetitive conduct unless we are 
relatively sure that Congress intended to exempt it.23 Although he is 
certainly not the first commentator to call for a cutback on the United 
States' very expansive "state action" doctrine,24 Professor Waller is one 
of the first to use other nations' experience with a very different 
approach to this issue to persuasively support the argument that the 
United States' approach is unwise.25 At a minimum, he advocates that 
we affirmatively debate and decide this issue, rather than just passively 
accept this judicially created doctrine.26 
There is an irony that, from an antitrust perspective, states within the 
United States have more autonomy and power than do nations within 
the European Union.27 States here have more power both to immunize 
allegedly anticompetitive activity, and also to challenge it.28 I share 
Professor Waller's concern about the likelihood that the United States' 
current approach results in widespread anticompetitive behavior and 
handicaps our negotiating position in a variety of international 
contexts.29 I accept his belief that we should change our approach, and 
I also accept his proposed solution.3o 
I have questions, however, concerning how Professor Waller's 
suggestion could ever be implemented. There is a maxim that it is 
21. See id. at 124-25. 
22. See id. at 126-27. 
23. See id. at 126. 
24. Nor does he claim to be. Waller cites others who have advocated this same position. See 
id. 
25. See id. at 114, 126-27 (discussing the work of other scholars). Waller also provides a 
number of additional arguments as to why the current United States' "state action" doctrine is 
unwise. See id. at 115-16. 
26. See id. at 127. 
27. See id. at 118-20 (discussing autonomy of U.S. states); id. at 120-22 (discussing EU 
nations). 
28. See id. at 118-20. 
29. See id. at 118-19 (discussing anticompetitive behavior); id. at 124-25 (discussing 
handicapping in international contexts). 
30. See id. at 126-27. 
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harder to take something away than never to get it in the first place. 
Now that our states enjoy this autonomy, how can we get them to 
relinquish something they regard as their right?3l 
Professor Waller provides two new arguments that might move our 
nation closer to his ideal.32 The first is his argument which points out 
that France, Germany and Italy gave up much more autonomy than did 
the states within the United States.33 The second is his documentation 
demonstrating that not doing so will increasingly disadvantage the 
United States in a variety of international areas.34 
Another possibility is to devise ways whereby our states can 
temporarily give up some of their autonomy in a voluntary, non-binding 
manner. After some experience, the states might be willing to 
relinquish this power more formally and permanently. 
The merger area could provide an example where this possibility 
could work. In the United States, any state can challenge any corporate 
merger. 35 If IBM, Microsoft, and AT&T attempted to merge, for 
example, any state could challenge the merger even if federal enforcers 
thought that the merger was benign or pro-consumer. 36 It is even 
possible that such a challenge could be without merit, yet the delays and 
uncertainty caused by the challenge could scuttle a transaction that the 
federal enforcers believed was in the public interest. 37 
By contrast, if an analogous merger happened in Europe it would be 
reviewed by the European Union, but not by the individual member 
states.38 Because I believe that the issue of whether such a merger 
would be good for our country should be a national one, in this respect 
the European system is superior to ours. The difficulty, however, is the 
31. Many state antitrust enforcers remember the vacuum created by the virtual non-
enforcement of antitrust by the federal enforcers during the Reagan Administration. The state 
enforcers are reluctant to give up any of their enforcement power in part because of their fear that 
an era of virtual non-enforcement could return. 
32. See Waller, supra note I, at 126-27. 
33. See id. at 118-19,121-22. 
34. See id. at 124-25. 
35. The only limitation is that the challenged merger must affect commerce within that state. 
This is not much of a limitation. See Robert H. Lande, When Should States Challenge Mergers: 
A Proposed FederallState Balance, 35 N.Y. L. SCH. L. REv. 1047, 1049-52, 1061-62 (1990) 
(discussing the balance between state and federal merger enforcement, and proposing guidelines 
that would allocate merger enforcement between state and federal enforcers). 
36. See id. at 1061-62 (discussing how critics oppose the relative ease with which state 
attorneys general can challenge corporate mergers). 
37. See id. at 1061-62, 1065. 
38. The nation states in the European Union can only review a large merger under relatively 
unusual circumstances. See id. at 1075 (discussing three exceptions under which individual 
member nations can challenge mergers). 
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political issue of how we could move our system closer to the European 
model. 
One way to move towards the ideal would be for federal and state 
antitrust enforcers in the United States to agree upon a voluntary 
division of merger authority.39 Mergers with a truly national dimension 
- like the one hypothesized above - would be handled by federal 
enforcers. Mergers that were relatively small or that primarily affected 
a particular state could be left to the appropriate state antitrust enforcers. 
Such division of authority could be modeled after the European solution 
to this issue40 and could, indeed, be a productive emulation of the 
European antitrust model. 
III. ANTITRUST AS REGULATION 
Professor Waller correctly observes that in the United States antitrust 
and economic regulation are viewed as being very different.41 He 
demonstrates that in reality, however, the two systems are not as 
different as we generally believe.42 He shows that in the United States 
the notion of antitrust as a one-time, "yes or no," market intervention 
has increasingly been replaced by a form of antitrust that is closer to 
traditional forms of economic regulation.43 While no one would ever 
mistake the Federal Trade Commission for the Federal Communications 
Commission, the Federal Trade Commission has, as Professor Waller 
has shown, certainly moved in that agency's direction in recent years.44 
He also demonstrates that most other nations, by contrast, view antitrust 
as a subset of the field of economic regulation, and as a form of light 
regulation.45 
Why the continued, even vehement insistence by much if not most of 
the United States antitrust community that antitrust is not a form of 
39. See id. at 1072-91 (proposing a solution to responsibility for merger enforcement by 
designating areas of federal responsibility, state responsibility and shared responsibility). 
40. See id. at 1074-81 (discussing the benefits and problems associated with adopting the 
European model in the United States). 
41. See Waller, supra note I, at 127. 
42. See id. 
43. See id. Professor Waller develops this argument in more detail in Spencer Weber Waller, 
Prosecution by Regulation: The Changing Nature of Antitrust Enforcement, 77 OR. L. REV. 1383 
(1998). 
44. In one important respect the Federal Trade Commission might be about to take a step 
back. Chairman Pitofsky believes that the Commission should playa smaller role in restructuring 
mergers. See Robert Pitofsky, The Nature and Limits of Restructuring in Merger Review, 
Remarks at the Cutting Edge Antitrust Conference (Feb. 17,2000) available at <http://www.ftc. 
gov/speeches/pitofsky/restruct.htm1>. 
45. See Waller, supra note I, at 128. 
2000] Professor Waller's Un-American Approach 143 
regulation? I offer three possible reasons. The first is theoretical. 
Antitrust has, as an essential part of its foundation, the concept of 
market failure. 46 The "big picture" reason for the existence of the 
antitrust laws is the belief that the market usually will work optimally, 
but that sometimes a cartel or large merger will prevent it from doing 
so. Under these very limited circumstances a one time or, increasingly, 
a slightly more complicated intervention is necessary.47 By contrast, 
traditional economic regulation starts from the opposite presumption: 
there are certain industries for which market forces essentially cannot 
work, so we must use regulation to mimic the workings of the free 
market as best as we can.48 These differing initial theoretical 
underpinnings affect how the antitrust profession views itself no matter 
how carefully Professor Waller points out how much the fields have 
converged over the years. 
Second, antitrust started as being quite different from other forms of 
regulation. Professor Waller has shown how antirust and other 
regulation forms have evolved towards one another over the years.49 
Most of his examples, however, are taken from the current generation.5o 
Antitrust in 1980, and certainly in 1960, was much closer to law 
enforcement than it is now. Yet, when practitioners think "what is 
antitrust?" they inevitably invoke memories of antitrust's past, the 
majority of which was much less regulatory than antitrust's present. 
A final explanation is ideological. During the Reagan Administration 
virtually all government regulation was sharply denounced.51 
"Regulation" was a dirty word, and regulators were, at best, a necessary 
evil and, at worst, lazy leeches stealing from the taxpayers.52 People in 
the antitrust community tried to find protection, or "cover," by denying 
that they were engaged in economic regulation. The antitrust 
comrnunity53 tried to say, in effect: "we are not regulators; if anything, 
46. See Neil W. Averitt & Robert H. Lande, Consumer Sovereignty: A Unified Theory of 
Antitrust and Consumer Protection Law, 65 ANTITRUST L.J. 713, 722-34 (1997). 
47. See id. at 716-20. 
48. See RICHARD A. POSNER, EcONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 377-97 (5th ed. 1998). 
49. See Waller, supra note I, at 127. 
50. See POSNER, supra note 48, at 377-97; Waller, supra note 43, at 1397-1400, 1401-08, 
1409-17,1423-25. 
51. Recall President Reagan's statement that, "government is not the solution to our problem; 
government is the problem." Ronald Reagan, First Inaugural Address (Jan. 20, 1981) available at 
<http://bcn.boulder.co.us!governmentlnational!speeches/inau4.htm1>. 
52. Ironically, the high priority that conservatives have for business certainty and for limits on 
the discretion of government officials may have helped to increase the role of formal guidelines 
and other relatively regulatory devices in antitrust. 
53. I was employed at the Federal Trade Commission from 1978 to 1984. 
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we are deregulators; we believe in the wonders of free markets, and 
only intervene on rare occasions, and then, only to help the market 
work." Even today, when certain people call antitrust a form of 
regulation I, perhaps incorrectly, view that as a possible attack on the 
legitimacy of the entire antitrust field. 54 
Suppose, however, that the United States did regard antitrust as 
another light form of regulation. This view would have the advantage 
of being more accurate. But could it make any other difference? 
It is possible that the perception of antitrust as a form of light 
regulation could make it easier for the United States to engage in 
worthwhile economic deregulation. For example, when the airlines 
were deregulated55 proponents of deregulation commonly pointed out 
that regulation would not be eliminated entirely - it would instead be 
replaced with antitrust law so that if the airlines formed a cartel or tried 
to engage in anticompetitive mergers, antitrust enforcement (instead of 
direct regulation) would protect consumers.56 If antitrust were 
portrayed as just another form of regulation, then the proponents of the 
next target of deregulation - electricity, for example - could say that 
they were not abolishing regulation, they were only replacing one form 
of regulation with another. Perhaps this would be another way to sell 
deregulation efforts. 
Let me now combine Professor Waller's first two main ideas in a 
concrete area. The United States has a very broad antitrust exemption 
for our insurance industry.57 This exemption is the product of both a 
statute that largely leaves insurance regulation to the states58 and our 
expansive "state action" doctrine.59 The insurance industry argues that 
54. For example, Professor Waller notes that Professor Fred McChesney, a leading 
conservativellibertarian critic of antitrust enforcement, has called antitrust just another form of 
regulation. See Waller, supra note 43, at 1386. When Professor McChesney lumps antitrust 
together with other forms of economic regulation, he certainly is not doing so in order to 
compliment the basic idea of having antitrust laws or antitrust enforcement. Other scholars that 
Waller cites, however, are much more supportive of antitrust, and their use of the comparison 
would not have an ideological aspect to it. See id. at 1386 n.9. 
55. See Airline Deregulation Act of 1978, 49 U.S.c. §§ 40101-40120 (1994), amended by 
Pub. L. No. 106-181, Title ill, § 301, Title VII, § 702(a), 114 Stat. 115, 155 (current version at 49 
V.S.C.A. §§ 40101-40124 (West 1997 & Supp. 2000)). 
56. See Stephen G. Breyer, Antitrust. Deregulation and the Newly Liberated Marketplace, 75 
CAL. L. REV. 1005,1007-09 (1987). 
57. See 9 EARL W. KINTER & JOSEPH P. BAUER, FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAW 34, 179-80 
(1989). 
58. See McCarran-Ferguson Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011-15 (1994). 
59. See Group Life & Health Ins. Co. v. Royal Drug Co., 440 V.S. 205,231-33 (1979) 
(defining the scope of the insurance industry exemption); Jeffrey D. Schwartz, Comment, The 
Use of the Antitrust State Action Doctrine in the Deregulated Electric Utility Industry, 48 AM. U. 
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all kinds of calamities will befall it, the insured, and our economy if the 
industry were subjected to normal antitrust scrutiny instead of the 
existing system of state-by-state regulation.60 
Scholars might do well to follow Professor Waller's lead and find 
developed economies where the insurance industry is subject, not to 
regulation, but to an antitrust regime that is similar to the one that we 
have in the United States. This would be an excellent way to test 
whether the calamities that the insurance industry has predicted would 
actually come to pass in the United States if we ever deregulated this 
industry and subjected it to normal antitrust scrutiny. 
I am proposing, in other words, something similar to the suggestion 
Professor Waller makes in Section IV of his paper.6J In this section he 
suggests analyzing the experience of other nations in the antidumping 
area for ideas on how we might modify our own antidumping regime.62 
I share his lack of love for our dumping laws and his hope that the study 
of foreign approaches in this area will give us ideas for ways to cut back 
antidumping enforcement in a manner that might be politically saleable. 
This is another wonderful example of how the United States could learn 
much from a comparative approach to law. 
IV. WILL THE HIGHEST COMMON DENOMINATOR RULE? 
Professor Waller notes that the recent proliferation of antitrust 
regimes could lead to a situation where the highest common 
denominator rules.63 Multinational firms increasingly will have to 
conform their practices to dozens of different antitrust regimes and 
might, out of risk aversion, simplicity, or inflexibility, conform their 
practices to the most stringent laws.64 Large multinational mergers 
could potentially be blocked, in whole or in part, by any of these 
enforcers. 65 
L. REV. 1449, 1457-59 (1999) (defining and detailing the origin of the "state action" doctrine). 
60. See Alan M. Anderson, Insurance and Antitrust Law: The McCarran-Ferguson Act and 
Beyond, 25 WM. & MARY L. REv. 81, 83-90 (1983) (discussing the history of the McCarran-
Ferguson Act and the insurance industry's rationale for requesting an antitrust exception). 
61. See Waller, supra note I, at 134-36. 
62. See id. 
63. See id. 
64. See William E. Kovacic, Getting Started: Creating New Competition Policy Institutions in 
Transition Economies, 23 BROOK. 1. INT'L L. 403, 404 (1997); Robert H. Lande, Creating 
Competition Policy For Transition Economies, 23 BROOK. 1. INT'L. L. 339, 339-40 (1997). 
65. See Eleanor M. Fox, Extraterritoriality and Merger Law: Can All Nations Rule the 
World?, December 1999 ANTITRUST REPORT at 2. 
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Professor Waller concludes that to the extent this occurs, it could be 
desirable.66 Some nations' enforcers would likely challenge an 
anticompetitive merger, joint venture, or cartel even if other nations' 
enforcement agencies were understaffed, stupid, or corrupt. Whether 
this is desirable, however, depends in part upon one's ideology. If you 
are a conservative then this possibility of a trend toward the highest 
common denominator is highly undesirable. If you regard virtually 
every merger or joint venture as benign or desirable, you want as few 
regimes that would potentially challenge them as possible.67 You 
would want the opposite of the situation that Waller foresees - a lowest 
common denominator approach where the most lenient standard would 
control. You might even feel the same way about cartels. If you 
believe the enforcers of most countries were likely to be corrupt, even 
widespread anti-cartel enforcement would do more harm than good.68 
Antitrust enforcement against cartels would just represent additional 
occasions for graft by the enforcers and judges, but would not benefit 
the pUblic.69 
By contrast, if you believe that strong antitrust enforcement usually is 
desirable, you probably would regard Professor Waller's prediction, to 
the extent it occurs, as welcome. Foreign cartels, for example, can 
escape antitrust prosecution in a variety of ways, including the act of 
state doctrine (OPEC's methodfO or by operating in such a manner that 
they do not do business in countries with unfavorable antitrust laws (De 
66. See Waller, supra note I, at 134-35. 
67. For an example of scholars with very conservative, anti-interventionist views in this area, 
see A. E. Rodriguez & Malcolm B. Coate, Competition Policy in Transition Economies: The Role 
oj Competition Advocacy, 23 BROOK. 1. INT'L. LAW 365 (1997). 
68. See id. at 394-400 (suggesting that much antitrust enforcement is rent-seeking behavior). 
69. These enforcement actions would just transfer rents from cartel members to the corrupt 
enforcers and judges. These transfers would not benefit the public and could serve to further 
erode societal respect for the rule of law. 
70. See International Ass'n of Machinists v. OPEC, 649 F.2d 1354 (9th CiT. 1981). In OPEC, 
the International Association of Machinist and Aerospace Workers argued that OPEC violated 
United States antitrust law through fixing the price of oil and petroleum derived products. See id. 
at 1355. The court held that the activities of OPEC were immune from suit under the act of state 
doctrine. See id. at 1361-62. In defining this doctrine the court stated, "[tJhe act of state doctrine 
declares that a United States court will not adjudicate a politically sensitive dispute which would 
require the court to judge the legality of the sovereign act of a foreign state." [d. at 1358. 
However, the Supreme Court in Kirkpatrick Co. v. Environmental Tectonics Corp. limited the 
application of the act of state doctrine. See 493 U.S. 400 (1990). In Kirkpatrick, the Court held 
that the act of state doctrine does not apply where a foreign government may merely be 
embarrassed about the outcome of litigation. See id. at 409. The Court stated, "[tJhe act of state 
doctrine does not establish an exception for cases and controversies that may embarrass foreign 
governments, but merely requires that, in the process of deciding, the acts of foreign sovereigns 
taken within their own jurisdictions shall be deemed valid." [d. 
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Beers does not do business in the United States).7) So, clever cartels 
often can act with impunity. This is especially true because large 
multinational companies often can be flexible on a nation-by-nation 
basis. They can retain local counsel and avoid each nation's antitrust 
laws on a country-by-country basis. 
I largely agree with Professor Waller's prediction. Since I am 
generally in favor of vigorous antitrust enforcement I agree with his 
point that much good could arise if the highest common denominator 
rules. Conservatives also should agree with his prediction, even if they 
do not like its implications. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Professor Waller's admonition that the United States should analyze 
the experience of other nations in the antitrust area is a sound one. Over 
time the United States antitrust community increasingly will come to 
regard the individuals and institutions involved in the antitrust efforts of 
the European Union and other countries as our equals rather than as our 
younger siblings or children. As this happens I hope that we will follow 
Professor Waller's advice more than we do currently. For all these 
reasons I am delighted that Professor Waller has engaged in this un-
American approach to antitrust. 
71. See Dale J. Montpelier, Comment, Diamonds Are Forever? Implications of United States' 
Antitrust Laws on International Trade and the De Beers Diamond Cartel, 24 CAL. W. INT'L. L. J. 
277, 299 (1994) (discussing the corporate structure and sales practices of De Beers and the 
Department of Justice's attempts to enforce United States antitrust law extraterritorially). 
*** 
